Abstract. The RSA public-key encryption system of Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman can be broken if the modulus, R say, can be factorized. However, it is still not known if this system can be broken without factorizing R. A version of the RSA scheme is presented with encryption exponent e -= 3 (mod 6). For this modified version, the equivalence of decryption and factorization of R can be demonstrated.
Introduction
The RSA scheme can be developed in any domain with unique factorization. Here we use the ring Z [co] of Eisenstein integers, where co = 89 1 + x/r~3) is a primitive cube root of unity. The public-key encryption system is made up of a community of users, each with individual encryption and decryption keys. The encryption key consists of a modulus R in Z[co] and a positive integer e, called the encryption exponent. The decryption key is another integer exponent d. For each user, the encryption key is made publicly accessible, but the decryption key is kept secret. The modulus R is the product of two carefully selected large primes p and q in Z [col. In addition, e must be relatively prime to tp(R) = (pp -l)(q~ -1). With this proviso, d can be obtained by solving the congruence de = 1 (mod ~o(R)).
The protocol for sending messages follows the usual lines. First, assign numerical equivalents to the symbols of the message (for example, A = 01, B = 02 .... ). If the resulting numerical string is very long, break it into blocks representing numbers no larger than I RI. Take the blocks in pairs and interpret the pair a, b as the Eisenstein integer a + bco. To send a message M, coded in this way as an element of Z [co] , the sender computes C = M e (mod R) using the encryption key (R, e). (As in Z, the congruence notation ct = fl (mod m) in Z [co] means that m divides ~ -ft. We are working with the complete set of residues described in Section 3 below). To determine the plaintext M from the ciphertext C, the recipient uses the secret key d and calculates M = C a (mod R). If R can be factorized, then d is easy to determine given R and e. So breaking the cipher is at most as difficult as factorization.
The purpose of this paper is to present a modified version of the RSA cryptosystem in Z [co] . It will be shown that breaking the system is equivalent to factorizing the modulus R. In what follows, R will be the product of two primes in specified congruence classes modulo 9 in Z[co], so factorizing R is not quite the same as factorizing an arbitrary integer in Z [co] . On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that factorizing R is any easier than factorizing an arbitrary integer in Z [co].
Williams [Wil] , [Wi2] and Rabin [R] have also proposed public-key schemes which are provably as intractable as factorization. The papers [Wil] and I-RI take the encryption exponent e = 2 and [Wi2] takes e = 3. This paper provides an alternative approach to the case e = 3. The main difference in the description of the system lies in the choice of the complete set of residues used in defining the message space in Section 3. The choice used here has a geometrical flavour which we have found helpful.
Arithmetic in Z [v~]
In this section we summarize the essential facts about cubic residues in Z [co] . A basic reference is Chapter 9 of [IR] .
As above, set co = 89 1 + x/Z3). The ring Z [col comprises all numbers of the form a + bco with a and b in Z, the ring of rational integers. Multiplication is easily performed using 09 2= --1-co. For 9 = a + bco in Z[co], we define the norm Net = ~ = a 2 -ab + b 2. There are six units in Z[co], namely _+ 1, _co, +092. The numbers ~, fl in Z[co] are called associates if 9 = flu for some unit u in Z [co] . A number ~ = a + bco is called primary if a = 2 (mod 3) and b = 0 (mod 3). Each ct in Z [09] with Net = 1 (mod 3) has a unique associate which is primary. In particular, this applies to any prime p in Z [co-] 
This is well defined because ~t Np-I -1 (mod p). Moreover, ~t is a cubic residue if and only if (ctlp)3 = I. The definition is extended multiplicatively to any modulus R for which NR is not divisible by 3 as follows: if
where the Pi are distinct primes in Z [co] and Npi ~ 3, then
The cubic residue symbol has the properties: The reciprocity law makes it easy to calculate the cubic residue symbol. Consider (Q11Q2)3, where 3•NQ2. We write Qi = (1 -co)l'uiR i, where (1 -co)l, is the exact power of the prime 1 -co dividing Qi, ui is a unit, and R i is primary. If(Q t, Q2) # 1, then (Qll Q2)a = 0. Otherwise, since 3 X NQ2,
and the first two symbols on the right are given by 4a above. Using the Euclidean algorithm, we can write Rt klR2 q-Q3,
(1 -co)l'u4R4, and so on.
Since the norms of the remainders decrease geometrically, the algorithm must terminate and finally we reach the statement that Qm+t, say, is a unit and Rm+l = -1. By the reciprocity law,
and so on.
This algorithm runs in time polynomial in the length of the numbers involved.
The following calculation is used later.
Lemma 1. Suppose R = pq, where p, q are distinct primes in Z[co], 3 X NR and Nq =_ 2Np -1 (rood 9). If (MIR)3 = 1, then
Proof. Since (MI R)3 --1, we have (MIP)3" (MIq)3 = 1, giving three cases according as (MlP)3 = 1, co, or co2. If, say, (MBP)a = co, then
Combining these two assertions gives the required congruence modulo pq. The other two cases are done similarly.
[] We use the cubic residue symbol to separate the cube roots modulo R in Z [co]. For this purpose, it is necessary to make some assumptions on R. If p is a primary prime in Z[co] and Np ~ 1 (mod 9), then (colP)3 # 1 and so the three cube roots of 3 modulo p, namely ~, co~, and co2~, give different values of the cubic residue symbol (' [P)3. We can therefore define the principal cube root ~ of ~3 modulo p to be the choice with (~IP)3 = 1. Now suppose R = pq, where p and q are primary primes in Z[co] and Np, Nq -~ 1 (mod 9). As explained above a cube, 6 3 say, has nine cube roots modulo pq. We choose the principal cube root [~,/~] as follows: ~ is the principal cube root of 6 3 modulo p and/~ is the principal cube root of 6 3 modulo q. The nine cube roots of 6 3 modulo R are given by 6 = [u~, v]~], where u and v run through the cube roots of unity. Note that ((51R)3 = (ulP)3(vlq)3 = U(I/3)(Np-I)13(i/3)(Nq-1), so we can split the nine roots into three types each containing three of the roots as follows: we say 6 has type 1, 2, or 3 according as (JIR) 3 = 1, 01, or ol 2. Note that the type can be determined without factorizing R since it only depends on the value of the cubic residue symbol.
Suppose, in addition, that Np ~ Nq (mod 9). After interchanging p and q if necessary, we may suppose that Np -7 (mod 9) and Nq -4 (mod 9). Now it is easy to check that the nine cube roots of 6 3 modulo pq are grouped as follows: There is a number w in Z[01] such that (wlR)3 ~ 1. Multiplying by w changes the type. For definiteness, we investigate the case p -8 + 601 (mod 9) and q = 5 + 6o9 (mod 9) for which (1 -011R)3 = 01. (The last assertion follows from the first part of the cubic reciprocity law.) In this case, ifX has type t, then (1 -01)X has type (t + 1) (mod 3)) and (l -01)2X has type (t + 2) (mod 3). Other choices for p and q modulo 9 can be handled with minor modifications.
The Message Space
In what follows, we suppose R = pq, where p, q are primary primes in Z[co], p = 8 + 601 (mod 9), and q = 5 + 601 (mod 9).
A complete set of residues modulo R, or a fundamental region, is a set A such that each element of the lattice Z[01] is congruent modulo R to exactly one element of A. We take A to be the parallelogram with vertices 0, R, (1 + 01)R, and 01R, including the lattice points on the sides joining 0 to R and 0 to 01R, but not the endpoints R and 01R, nor the lattice points on the other two sides. (See Fig. 1 .) In the figure, 01A and 012A are respectively obtained by rotating A through 2n/3 and 4n/3 anticlock- Note that the number of lattice points close to the boundary of A is proportional to the length of the boundary, so is O(IRI), while the total number of lattice points in A is Ihl = NR = IRI 2.
Encryption and Decryption
As before, let R = pq, where p, q are primary primes in Z I-o2], p = 8 + 609 (rood 9) and q -5 + 6o) (mod 9). Note that tp(R) = (Np -1)(Nq -1) is an even integer and congruent to 18 modulo 27. Let h be a rational integer such that (h, tp(R)) = 1. The encryption exponent is e = 3h; note that e = 3 (mod 6).
Encryption.
Let M be a message in A and set M1 = (1 -fo)M + 1. We assume that M1 is relatively prime to R. To effect encryption, first calculate N=Ex(M)=(1-fo)4-'M 1, where (MllR)s=fo '-t (t= 1,2, or3).
Then determine Ez(N) to be the point in the fundamental region A satisfying Ez(N ) = N e (mod R).
To summarize, for a plaintext M in A, the ciphertext C is given by
Deerypfion. Decryption is also the result of two steps. The decryption exponent d is obtained by solving the congruence hd = 89 + ~tp(R)) (mod tp(R)).
The first decryption stage is to determine D2(C) to be the point in the fundamental region A satisfying
Lemma 2 below shows that D2 is almost the inverse of E2.
We proceed to the second stage of the decryption process. Given X in A with X ~ 0 and arg X/R ~ rr/3, there is a unique point Y = F(X), say, in H c, the closure of H, such that Y = X (mod R) and 1 -col Y-In fact, if 0 < arg X/R < n/3, there are three points in H ~ which are congruent to X modulo R, namely X, X -R, and X -fo2R, and these three points form a complete set of residues modulo 1 -co. Exactly one of them is divisible by 1 -co. If r~/3 < arg X/R < 2rc/3, the same argument applies to the points X, X -foR, and X -foZR. Now let (1 -fo)s be the exact power of 1 -co dividing Y and choose Z = G(Y), say, to be that one of Y, toY, or fo2 y such that
The decrypted text obtained from the ciphertext C is
provided this is defined (that is, C ~ 0 and arg Dz(C) ~ n/3).
It remains to verify the assertions made above and to confirm that D 2 is essentially the inverse of E2 (Lemma 2) and that D is the inverse of E (Theorem 1).
Lemma 2. Suppose R = pq where p and q are distinct primes in Z [o9], Np =-7 (mod 9) and Nq -4 (rood 9). If(N]R)3 = 1, then D2E2(N ) : E2D2(N ) --~ N(Nlp) 2 (mod R).

Moreover, if (K, R) --1, then E2D2E2(K ) = E2(K ).
Proof. Suppose (NIR)3 = 1. By Lemma 1,
X (say) --D2E2(N) = E2D2(N) -N ed -N 1+~/9 -N(NIp) ] (mod R).
Next, suppose K is relatively prime to R. Let N be a cube root of K a of type 1, that is N 3 -K a (mod R) and (NIR)3 = 1. Then
E2(N )-N 3h-K ah-E2(K ) (modR)
and so, by the first part,
E2DEE2(K ) =-E2D2E2(N ) =-E2(N(NIp) 2) =--Nah =-E2(K ) (mod R).
However, E2(K ) and E2D2E2(K ) both lie in the fundamental region A, so they are in fact equal.
[] The next theorem confirms that decryption is the inverse of encryption.
Theorem 1. If M is in A and M 1 = (1 -a~)M + 1 is relatively prime to R, then D(E(M)) = D1D2E2EI(M ) = D1E2D2EI(M ) = M.
Proof. Suppose M is in A. Then N = El(M) is in H, 1 -o9[N, and (NIR) 3 = 1. By Lemma 2,
X (say) = D2E2(N) = E2D2(N) =-N(NIp) 2 (mod R).
Since X is in A, N is in H, and 1 -ogIN, it follows that F(X) = N(Nlp) 2. Suppose M~ = (1 -o9)M + 1 has type t, so that N lies in the corresponding shaded parallelogram of Fig. 2 
. The preceding definitions yield G(F(X)) = N and so DI(X ) = M. This proves the theorem. []
Example. It may be helpful to give an example with "small" numbers to illustrate the construction of this section. Take the modulus R --41 + 12o9 and encryption exponent e = 3. Then R = --pq, where p = -1 + 6o9 and q = 5 + 6o9 are primary primes in the prescribed residue classes modulo 9. Take the message M = 1 + 2o9, so that M~ = 4 + 3o9 and M is in the message space and we have (M~, R) = 1. We follow through the coding and decoding algorithms, using the notation of this section. By the definition of the cubic residue symbol and the law of cubic reciprocity, we can compute (4 + 3o91P)3 = o92, (4 + 3o91q)3 = o9, and (4 + 3oglR) 3 = 1, so we have N = (1 -o9)3M 1 = 6 -15o9 and the ciphertext is C (= N 3 (rood R)) = 11 -13o9. The decryption exponent is d = 47 and, by Lemma 2, the first stage of the decoding gives X = D2(C) (=-N(NIp)] (mod R)) = 15 + 21o9 = -(1 -og)a(-3 + o9).
Since (1 -o9)311x, we set Y = X = 15 + 21o9 and Z = o92y = 6 -15o9 =
(1 -o9)3(4 + 3o9). Finally, D~(X) = 1 + 2o9 which returns the original message M.
Factorization and Decryption
The security of an RSA scheme depends on the difficulty of factorizing the modulus of the system. Certainly, if R is factorized, then ~0(R) is easy to compute and the decryption procedure of Section 4 runs in polynomial time, that is O(log NR) multiprecision operations. For general RSA schemes, it is not known whether there is a method for breaking the code which is easier than factorizing the modulus. However, we shall establish the equivalence of factorizing the modulus R and decrypting the modified RSA scheme of Section 4. This statement is made precise in Theorem 2 below. The factorization algorithm is based on the observation that if we can find two cube roots, X and Y say, of the same number modulo R, but of different types, then we have
and so one of the greatest common divisors (X -ogiy, R) gives a nontrivial factor of R. N, toN, or to2N for N in @.
D2E2(N ) =-
Suppose that we can find K such that (K, R) = 1 and (KIR)3 # 1 and X = E2(K ) -K e (mod R) is in qa. Set N --D2(X ), so that N is in @ and, in particular, (NJR)a = 1. Moreover, by Lemma 2, E2(N ) = E2(K). Since (h, tp(R)) = 1, there is a unique W in A such that W h -X (mod R). Now, N 3h, K 3h, and W h are all congruent to X modulo R. Thus N and K are cube roots of W of different types and the remark at the beginning of this section can be used to obtain the factorization of R.
We find K with the properties listed above by trial and error. The sets A, @, and have the same number of elements and this number is asymptotic to (49/972)NR. Consider X in ~P. There is a unique W such that W h = X (mod R) and there are nine choices of K satisfying g 3 -W (mod R). Of these, six have (KIR)3 # I. So the number of K with the properties required above is asymptotically (294/972)NR. On the average, the number of trials needed to find a suitable K is 972/294 ~. 3.3. [] Theorem 2 relies on an oracle D* which decrypts all ciphertexts. This is actually more than we need. Suppose that the oracle D* only decrypts a certain fraction ~,-~ of the ciphertexts in W. Then we need to choose K above so that E2(K) is an element of W which can be decrypted by D*. The number of K with this additional property is asymptotically (294/972)~-1NR. The expected number of applications of D* in the algorithm is now (972/294)r
Concluding Remarks
The main result of this paper is comparable to that of Williams in [Wi2] . The approach used is a natural extension of the method of Williams [Will concerned with the encryption function M --, M 2 (mod R). Both here and in [Wi2-1, the basic problem to be solved is to distinguish the cube roots of a number modulo R so that a ciphertext can be correctly decoded. In the present paper this is done by restricting the message space and giving an algorithm to find the distinguished cube root corresponding to a valid message. In I-Wi2] the idea is to transmit additional information with the ciphertext, namely the values of certain cubic residue symbols, in order that the ciphertext can be correctly decoded. There is another technical difference in that [Wi2] uses the rational integers {0, 1, 2 ..... NR -1} as the complete set of residues modulo R. It seems to us that the geometrical flavour of the specification used in this paper shows more promise for an extension to higher exponents such as e = 5. (However, we have not carried this through.)
With a minor modification of the usual method, the encryption scheme of Section 4 allows users to sign their messages. Suppose A has the encryption map E A = EzE1A . We have proved that decrypting the RSA scheme of this paper and factorizing the modulus are computationally equivalent. However, there may still be certain messages which can be decoded easily. This is certainly the case if, for example, By the laws of quadratic and cubic reciprocity, all these conditions are satisfied for primes lying in certain complete arithmetical progressions. If -3A is a square modulo p and q and at least one of the quantities -~q +__ ax/-SfA is not a cube modulo p or q, then there are no unconcealed messages. This implies that the cryptosystem is totally concealable for all the primes lying in certain complete arithmetical progressions. (The situation is more complicated if -3A is not a square.)
Rivest has pointed out that any cryptosystem in which there is a constructive proof of the equivalence of factorization and the breaking of the cipher will be vulnerable to a chosen ciphertext attack. (See [Wi 1 ].) Suppose B wishes to compromise the security of A's system. As in the proof of Theorem 2, B chooses K such that (KIR)3 :~ 1 and sends X = Eg(K) to A. To decrypt the message, A computes N = D~(X) and M = D~(N). IfB can obtain M from A, then B can break A's system because B knows both K and N = E~(M). As noted in the proof of Theorem 2, these are cube roots of the same number and of different types and (N -a~iK, R) is a nontrivial factor of R for i = 0, 1, or 2. In general, B may have difficulty in persuading A to reveal M. However, if this scheme is used as a key exchange protocol, then A would return EB(M) to B, so enabling B to compute the key M = DBES(M).
The scheme of this paper works, in particular, with exponent e = 3. However, there is a weakness in using an RSA cryptosystem with a fixed small encryption exponent e. Suppose the same message M is sent to at least 3e receivers, the ith receiver having public encryption modulus R i, and M lies in each of the corresponding message spaces. The type of M: = (1 -co)M + 1 will depend on i, in general, but it has only three possible values. We can therefore pick out e of the receivers for which M1 has the same type. Consider only these e receivers and renumber them 1 to e. The ciphertext sent to the ith of these receivers is then Ci = N e (mod Ri) where N = El(M) is independent of i. If, as is likely, the R t are relatively prime, then we can use the Chinese remainder theorem to find N* such that N*-N e (modR1R2""Re) and IN*I < IRtR2""Rel. Since N lies in the fundamental hexagon modulo R, we have [NI < IRil for each i and so N ~ < R1R2...R ~. Therefore, N* = N e and N = (N*) TM is revealed without the factorization of the moduli. To counter this attack, it is necessary to take a relatively large value of e as envisaged in the discussion of this paper.
While our discussion is mainly of theoretical interest, there is no serious difficulty in implementing the encryption and decryption procedures. Arithmetic in Z [co] is easy because this ring is a Euclidean domain and the various algorithms required are implicit in the descriptions we have given.
